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11.1  Introduction 
This study examines the market for a group of drugs used to treat rheu- 
matoid arthritis (RA) during the period 1980-92. Rheumatoid arthritis is 
a painful,  debilitating, and progressive disease which affects millions of 
people worldwide, with very substantial effects on health and the economy. 
Regrettably, in contrast to some other major health problems such as heart 
disease, depression, ulcers, and bacterial infections, this is an area where 
therapeutic innovations have thus far had comparatively little impact on 
physicians’ ability to reverse the disease. RA currently has no “cure” and 
the effectiveness of  available treatments  is limited.  Compared to other 
drug classes the rate of new product introductions has been slow, and, at 
the time of writing, there have been no breakthroughs of the same order 
of significance as the discovery and development of SSRIs for treatment of 
depression, H,  antagonists for ulcers, or ACE inhibitors for hypertension. 
Nonetheless, the market  for RA drugs is far from static. There have 
been significant changes over the past fifteen years in the market shares of 
competing products. Interestingly, relative prices have changed relatively 
lain M. Cockburn is professor of finance and economics at Boston University and a re- 
search associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Aslam H. Anis is associate 
professor of health economics in the Department of Health Care and Epidemiology, Univer- 
sity of  British Columbia, and team leader of  health  economics at the Center for Health 
Evaluation and Outcome Sciences, St. Paul’s Hospital, Vancouver. 
The authors thank Ernst Berndt, Zvi Griliches, John Esdaile, and NBER seminar partici- 
pants for helpful comments, and Jennifer Anderson  and David Felson for access to their 
databases on safetykfficacy profiles. The authors are grateful to BC Pharmacare for access 
to claims data; BEA, NBER, and Eli Lilly for financial support; and Merck for access to 
library records. Sophia Wang provided invaluable and very competent research assistance. 
The authors take full responsibility for any remaining errors. 
439 440  lain M. Cockburn and Aslam H. Anis 
little, and these market dynamics appear to be driven primarily by other 
factors. Here we focus on the role played by publication of clinical research 
findings. In contrast to traditional hedonic analysis where product charac- 
teristics are fixed but new products incorporating different quality levels 
appear over time, here the set of products is fixed while their measured 
quality changes over time. New information about the relative efficacy and 
toxicity of existing drugs accumulates through the publication of clinical 
trial results, and this information appears to have had a significant impact 
on the pattern of drug use. 
A  number  of  clinical  aspects  of  rheumatoid  arthritis  are  important 
structural features of the market for drugs used to treat the disease. We 
therefore begin with a brief review of the nature of RA and its treatment. 
We  then discuss issues related to the measurement of the relative efficacy 
and toxicity of drug treatments for RA. Next, we present economic data 
on the market for a specific set of drugs used in the treatment of severe RA 
and consider them in the context of models of demand for differentiated 
products. We then report the results of estimating price and market share 
equations.  In the concluding  section, we  suggest alternative  approaches 
that may provide some additional insight, in particular analysis of the role 
of advertising and promotional expenditures. 
11.2  Rheumatoid Arthritis 
RA is one of the most prevalent diseases affecting joints and connective 
tissue. RA is an autoimmune disease: For reasons that are still poorly un- 
derstood,  the  body’s  immune  system  begins  to malfunction,  attacking 
healthy tissue. Like related conditions such as lupus erythematosus, psori- 
atic arthritis, and scleroderma, the disease is systemic and chronic. Tissues 
are affected throughout the body, and although some patients experience 
prolonged periods of remission, most are affected for a lifetime.’ 
RA is characterized  by  inflammation  of  the synovium (a membrane 
which lines the joints) resulting in stiffness, pain, warmth, and swelling in 
joints. As the disease progresses, inflamed cells release an enzyme which 
erodes surrounding bone and cartilage, resulting in increased pain, loss of 
movement,  and eventually  destruction  of the joint.2 Patients experience 
greater and greater pain and loss of mobility. Fatigue often accompanies 
the “classica1”joint symptoms. In late stages of the disease, skin and vas- 
cular problems  (such as leg ulcers) may develop, along with damage to 
eyes and nerves and inflammation of lymph nodes, heart, and lungs. 
1. Brewerton (1  994) gives a comprehensive and readable overview of arthritis and its treat- 
ment. See also Cash and Klippel(1994), Wolfe (1990) and Steinman (1993). 
2. Establishing a conclusive diagnosis of RA can be difficult, especially in its early stages, 
since it shares many symptoms with other autoimmune diseases. Note that RA should not 
be confused with osteoarthritis, an even more prevalent disease, which has a distinct clinical 
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Research into the fundamental causes of the disease has inconclusively 
investigated many factors ranging from endocrine disorders to nutrition, 
geography, psychological conditions, and occupational hazards. Current 
thinking suggests that  some infectious agent may trigger the damaging 
autoimmune response in persons who have a genetic predisposition. How- 
ever, while a specific genetic marker (HLA-DR4) has been found to be 
present in a large fraction of RA patients, not all patients have the marker, 
and only a small fraction of people who have the marker go on to develop 
RA. Neither has the proposed infectious agent (possibly an unknown vi- 
rus) been identified, though various other arthritic and rheumatic condi- 
tions have been associated with infection by a number of organisms such 
as borelliu (the Lyme disease spirochete) and some streptococcal bacteria. 
RA affects between 1 and 2 percent of the population of OECD coun- 
tries. Women are two to three times more likely than men to develop dis- 
ease. In adults the onset of the disease is typically between ages forty and 
sixty, though significant numbers of people experience severe symptoms in 
their thirties and forties, and the disease can occur at any age. In some 
patients deterioration is rapid, while in others the disease progresses very 
slowly. Once affected, the outlook for most patients is poor. In many cases 
patients experience temporary relief of symptoms, but only very few have 
a complete remission of the disease. Chronic severe pain and restricted 
mobility have a very significant impact on the quality of life of RA pa- 
tients. Even with aggressive drug therapy, 7 percent of RA patients are 
significantly disabled within five years, and 50 percent are too disabled to 
work ten years after the onset of the disease. In addition to the morbidity 
effects of RA, Pincus and Callahan (1993) estimate that life expectancy is 
reduced among patients with RA by at least ten years. 
By any measure the total burden of the disease is substantial. Quality- 
adjusted life years (QALYs) lost may be as many as seven million per year 
in the  United  States3 The combination of severe health  impact, wide- 
spread incidence, and relatively early onset mean that very substantial eco- 
nomic losses are attributable to RA. For example, in  1997 the Arthritis 
Foundation reported that musculoskeletal conditions such as RA cost the 
U.S. economy approximately $65 billion per year in direct expenses and 
lost output. 
1 1.2.1 
Over the course of the disease, medical treatment of RA patients con- 
sists of physical intervention and drug therapy. Counseling or other psy- 
Treatment Options for Rheumatoid Arthritis 
3. In Canada, RA occurs in approximately 1 percent of  the population, or about 270,000 
people. It has been estimated that the average Canadian has significant pain andlor disability 
from arthritis resulting in an average of  2.5 quality-adjusted  life years (QALYs) lost. See 
Torrance and Feeny (1989) and Reynolds et al. (1993). Since RA tends to be more frequently 
disabling than osteoarthritis, a conservative estimate of the total disability among Canadians 
from RA would hence be 675,000 QALYs lost. 442  Iain M. Cockburn and Aslam H. Anis 
chotherapeutic intervention  may also play an important  role in  helping 
patients cope with the impact of the disease, and many patients also turn 
to “alternative” medicine. Physical intervention takes the form of physical 
therapy directed toward preservation of joint function and surgical proce- 
dures to address severe pathologies  of specific joints (e.g., hip replace- 
ment). Drug treatment, the focus of  this study, is given to almost all pa- 
tients who consult a physician: Of the approximately 5.1 million patient 
visits per year in the United States where RA is a primary diagnosis, more 
than 90 percent involved one or more drugs’ being prescribed. 
Two principal classes of drugs are used to treat RA: nonsteroidal anti- 
inflammatory  drugs  (NSAIDs)  and  disease-modifying  antirheumatic 
drugs (DMARDs). These two classes account for more than 65 percent of 
all prescriptions to RA patients, with corticosteroids accounting for a fur- 
ther 19 percent. It is important to note that drug therapy for RA normally 
follows a treatment hierarchy: Drug treatment begins with NSAIDs and 
moves on to DMARDs as the disease progresses. 
NSAIDs are the most frequently prescribed drugs for RA. Large num- 
bers of drugs fall into the NSAID class; among the most commonly used 
are aspirin, ibuprofen  (Motrin),  naproxen  (Naprosyn), diclofenac (Vol- 
taren), and piroxicam (Feldene). NSAIDs reduce inflammation and have 
an analgesic effect but do not affect progression of the disease. NSAIDs 
act quickly and are well tolerated by many patients but can cause a number 
of dangerous side effects, particularly when used in the high dosages indi- 
cated for RA. Gastrointestinal bleeding is the most frequently encountered 
severe side effe~t.~  While NSAIDs are the first line of defense, they offer 
only palliative treatment of symptoms, and as the disease progresses pa- 
tients will typically be given one of the DMARDs. This does not usually 
imply discontinuation of NSAID therapy, and in fact between 80 and 90 
percent of patients are prescribed drugs from both classes. 
The second-line DMARDs can suppress symptoms and slow the prog- 
ress of the disease, though they cannot halt it. DMARDs are slow acting, 
taking weeks or months before any significant improvement is noticed by 
the patient, and are often poorly tolerated. Different drugs are used with 
varying degrees of success in  different patients. Furthermore, many pa- 
tients are forced to discontinue the drug because of  serious side effects. 
Minor, though uncomfortable, side effects such as dermatitis, nausea, and 
mouth ulcers are quite frequently experienced. The incidence of  serious 
side effects such as retinal damage, renal failure, liver damage, and reduc- 
tion  in  blood  cell  counts,  while uncommon,  nonetheless  requires  close 
medical supervision and frequent diagnostic testing. 
4. COX-2 inhibitors, a new class of NSAIDs with a more selective mechanism of  action 
and lower incidence of side effects, have recently been introduced into the U.S.  market. These 
drugs include celecoxib (Celebrex) and rofecoxib (Vioxx). Hedonic Analysis of Arthritis Drugs  443 
Table 11.1  DMARD Drugs 
Drug 
Brand  U.S. Market 
Name(s)  Intro  Other Indications  Manufacturer 


























Immune suppression  Glaxo 
Merck 
for transplants  Wellcome 
Schering 
Malaria  Winthrop 
Leukemia, psoriasis  Lederle, 
Chelation  Merck, 
Ulcerative colitis,  Kabi, 
generics 
Wallace 
Crohn’s disease  generics 
The DMARDs approved for treatment of RA during the period of this 
study are listed in table 1  1.1. One point to note from this table is that many 
of these drugs are quite old, having been first introduced to the market 
many years ago. Auranofin (Ridaura) was the only strictly new molecule 
approved for RA in the period covered by this study. Other products such 
as methotrexate are new to the market in the sense that they have recently 
gained regulatory  approval for treatment of RA, though they may have 
been approved for other indications for many years or may have been used 
informally or in research settings for treatment of RA. (Lederle introduced 
Rheumatrex, a formulation of methotrexate specifically targeted at the RA 
market, in  1986.) Sulfasalazine, methotrexate,  and the antimalarials are 
off-patent, but generic production is significant only for methotrexate. It 
is also important to note that the original or primary indication of  most 
of the drugs was not RA. With the exception of the gold compounds, the 
activity of the DMARDs against RA was discovered subsequent to their 
first introduction to the market. Methotrexate was an early treatment for 
cancer, while hydroxychloroquine was developed as an antimalarial. The 
precise mechanism of action of most of these drugs is not well understood, 
though most have their therapeutic effect through suppressing the immune 
response. The anti-inflammatory activity of  gold compounds appears to 
be specific to arthritic conditions, while the immunosuppressant activity 
of azathioprine and methotrexate is much more general. 
In addition to DMARDs, physicians may also prescribe corticosteroids. 
This occurs in about 20 percent of patient visits in the United States. While 
these drugs can often produce dramatic short-term improvement in symp- 
toms, their long-term use is limited by serious side effects, principally os- 
teoporosis and increased susceptibility to infections. As a last resort, pa- 444  rain M. Cockburn and Aslam H. Anis 
tients may also be prescribed highly toxic third-line immunosuppressant 
drugs such as cyclophosphamide, cyclosporine, or chlorambucil. Without 
a new therapy which induces a lasting remission, physicians face difficult 
decisions and trade-offs in drug therapy for RA.5 
The timing of moving a patient from well-tolerated NSAIDs to the more 
toxic DMARDs is controversial, with some physicians arguing for early 
and aggressive second-line therapy to preempt irreversible joint damage, 
despite serious side effects. Even within the DMARD class it is far from 
clear which drug to prescribe. Only a fraction of patients obtain significant 
benefit from any one agent and even then the effect is often short-lived, 
typically lasting for only a few months or years. Over the twenty- to thirty- 
year course of the disease, a patient will typically cycle through a series of 
therapeutic  alternatives  as  their  physician  attempts  to arrest,  or  often 
merely to minimize, the cumulative destruction wrought by  the disease. 
Furthermore, professional opinion has changed over time regarding which 
drugs to use, and when. The information base on the relative efficacy and 
toxicity of these agents continues to evolve as new scientific evidence from 
clinical trials is published and physicians individually and collectively ac- 
cumulate more experience. The efficacyhoxicity trade-off lies at the heart 
of the prescribing decision, and changing perceptions of where drugs are 
located in this space drives our analysis of demand for these drugs. 
11.3  Measuring the “Quality” of Drug Treatments for RA 
We attempt to measure the characteristics of different DMARD drugs 
in  two general dimensions: efficacy and toxicity. Unlike some previous 
work on hedonics of pharmaceutical products we  pay little attention to 
differences in the dosage regimen. Though characteristics such as the num- 
ber of times a day the patient must take the drug appear to be an impor- 
tant determinant  of the relative value of  different ulcer drugs and anti- 
depressants (see Suslow 1992, 1996 and Berndt, Cockburn, and Griliches 
1997), we  believe them to be much  less important here. The very close 
involvement of the physician and the severe nature of the disease suggest 
to us that the impact of dosing regimens on patient compliance is unlikely 
to be an important factor.6 
5. Leflunomide (Arava), approved by the FDA in September 1998, is a new DMARD with 
a novel mechanism of action and potentially less severe side effects. A number of experimen- 
tal drugs, largely from the biotech sector of the industry, hold some promise for significant 
progress in treating arthritis and other autoimmune inflammatory disorders. Infliximab (En- 
brel), a genetically engineered protein, was approved by  the FDA for treatment of  RA in 
late 1998, but of most of these “large molecule” drugs are still in the early stages of testing. 
See Wall Street Journal. 17 July 1997, B1. 
6.  As a practical matter, dosage regimens for these drugs vary widely, are difficult to com- 
pare directly, and often involve complicated “ramp-up” schedules paced over many weeks. 
For  example, the maintenance dose of  methotrexate  is 7.5 mg spread  over  a week, while Hedonic Analysis of Arthritis Drugs  445 
Our primary measures of efficacy and toxicity are computed from the 
reported results of published clinical trials. We assume that the best avail- 
able information about the relative efficacy and toxicity of substitute drugs 
comes  from  published  reports  of  clinical  trials  that  appear  in  peer- 
reviewed scientific journals. These reports constitute a longitudinal data 
set which tracks the evolution of information on each drug over time. 
Based on Felson, Anderson, and Meenan (1990), we begin with the uni- 
verse of 216 published trials published between  1966 and  1995 listed in 
the MEDLINE database. Protocols and methodology vary widely across 
trials, and to establish a basis for comparison of results across trials (and 
to maintain a minimal level of methodological  quality) papers were ex- 
cluded if they did not meet the following criteria: 
Patient profile: adults eighteen and older, meeting American Rheumatism 
Association diagnostic criteria for RA 
Random assignment to treatment groups 
Blinded trial (at a minimum single-blinded) 
Appropriate minimum dosage levels 
At least eight weeks’ duration 
Imposing these criteria resulted in all but 66 of the original set of published 
trials being excluded. 
11.3.1  Efficacy Measures 
Efficacy of  drugs in these trials is established by  compiling measure- 
ments of a number of standard physiologic markers and outcome measures 
for patients in the different treatment groups at the beginning and end of 
each trial. These were 
Evythrocyte  sedimentation  rate (ESR), which is a physiologic marker of 
the level of overall systemic inflammation, derived from testing blood 
samples drawn from trial participants at predefined intervals  during 
the trial 
Tender joint count (TJC), which is a measure of the extent and severity of 
the disease in terms of the number of affected joints, compiled according 
to a standard protocol by a physician or nurse who assesses the patient 
and measured as difference (or percentage difference) over baseline 
Grip strength (GS),  which is another measure of the extent and severity of 
the disease, performed by measuring the pressure the patient is able to 
exert on a standard mechanical device, captured as either mean percent- 
sulfasalazine must be taken in relatively  large amounts several times per day, and most of 
the gold compounds are injectable. Quantifying dosage regimens with variables measuring 
route of  administration,  dosage frequency, and so on is tantamount econometrrically to 
simply using drug dummies. 446  lain M. Cockburn and Aslam H. Anis 
age improvement over baseline or the mean improvement standardized 
by baseline standard deviation 
Apart from these measurements, efficacy can also be measured by the re- 
ported  rate at which patients dropped out of each trial due to “lack of 
efficacy.” 
11.3.2  Toxicity Measures 
Toxicity is much harder to measure consistently. We have not been able 
to assemble consistent data on the actual incidence of side effects in each 
trial. Following previous work we  have experimented with variables con- 
structed by counting the number of side effects listed under categories such 
as “severe” or “frequent” in standard reference sources, or constructing 
dummy variables reflecting the locus of specific side effects (kidney dam- 
age, central nervous system, retina, etc.) but these perform poorly in exper- 
imental  regression^.^ Our preferred measure of toxicity is the reported rate 
at which patients dropped out of clinical trials due to “toxicity.” Summary 
statistics for these variables are given in table 11.2. 
11.3.3 
Because new trials are conducted periodically, information accumulates 
steadily over time, and variables constructed from reported trial  results 
form a longitudinal data set. We  combine data from different trials in a 
variety of ways intended to capture the evolution over time of the scientific 
information available to prescribing physicians. 
One possibility is to simply assign a value to each variable in each year 
based on the most recently published study. Thus we “ratchet” the level of 
each variable up or down in each year that a new trial came out, and carry 
forward the previous value otherwise. (In tables below we  refer to these 
measures as “latest.”) 
A second approach is to do a “rolling” cumulative meta-analysis which 
pools treatment groups over time and across drugs. As new trials are pub- 
lished results for each group of patients are added to the previous total, 
resulting in a continuously expanding sample. Mean treatment effects are 
the weighted sum of treatment effects in all trials to date. 
Third,  we  modify  the cumulative  meta-analysis  by  imposing various 
schemes  of  declining  weights  over  time  to  capture  “depreciation”  of 
knowledge. We  expect the results of trials conducted many years in  the 
past  to  weigh less heavily upon current prescribing practice than more 
recent evidence. The simplest such weighting scheme is a three- or five- 
year moving average. Alternatives such as a perpetual inventory deprecia- 
Changes in Quality over Time 
7. Clinicians may be most strongly influenced by the relative incidence of  severe adverse 
reactions. We have not yet compiled data on these effects. But note that since these events 
are very rare, their probability of occurrence is difficult to measure precisely. Hedonic Analysis of Arthritis Drugs  447 
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Azathioprine,  IOOmg 














































Note: n.a. = not available. 
,'I992 U.S.  dollars per daily maintenance dose. 
tion scheme or fixed declining weights do not yield materially different re- 
sults. 
11.4  Model 
The theoretical  literature provides  little guidance on  the appropriate 
functional form for estimating quality-adjusted prices.  Following many 
previous hedonic pricing studies (for pharmaceutical products, see Sus- 
low's analysis of ulcer drugs [1996] or Berndt, Cockburn, and Griliches's 
work on antidepressants [  19971) we use a semilog reduced form: 
(1) 
where x,,  represents the measured quality (i.e., toxicity and efficacy) char- 
acteristics of drug j;j  = 1, . . . ,  J  at time t; Z,  is a set of time dummies; 
and p,, denotes the time series of prices for drugj. 
For the market share equation, we follow Berry (1994) and Berry, Levin- 
sohn, and Pakes (1995) in specifying a logit type discrete choice model of 
demand for differentiated products to analyze the DMARD market. See 
King (1996) for a successful application of a modification of this approach 
to the anti-ulcer market. Following Berry we postulate that the utility of 
consumer i for product J is given by the function U(xJ,  E,,  p,,  a,,  v,),  where 
x,,  CJ, p,, 0, are  observed product  characteristics, unobserved  product 
characteristics, and price and demand parameters, respectively. The term 
v, is unobserved by the econometrician and represents a consumer-specific 
component of utility. To implement the model, one has to make specific 
parametric assumptions about the consumer-specific variables, analogous 
to the choice of functional form for a homogenous good demand equation. 
The utility derived by consumer i for product j can be written as 
WJ,)  = XJ,P + ZY  +  E/,  5 448  lain M. Cockburn and Aslam H. Anis 
(2) 
Averaging over consumers (we assume that the physicians who exercise 
control over the drug consumption decision act as perfect agents for their 
patients) and introducing time subscripts to reflect the fact that the per- 
ceived safety and efficacy characteristics of drugs change over time, we 
obtain a mean consumer utility level from choosing drugj  at time t as 
(3) 
where  may be interpreted as the mean of consumers’/physicians’ valua- 
tions of an unobserved product characteristic that is not captured by x,~ 
and we  use the assumption that E[E,] = O.* 
In addition to the competing DMARDs, j = 1, . . . ,  J, we  also assume 
the existence of an outside goodj, with pricep,.  In this context, consump- 
tion of the outside good can be thought of as the quantities of NSAIDs 
and all other non-DMARDs consumed by RA patients. (Empirically, al- 
most all RA patients’ visits to doctors result in their being prescribed ei- 
ther an NSAID or a DMARD or both. Only a tiny number of patients 
receive no drug therapy.) Letting q/ and q, and q, denote the quantities of 
drugj  and the outside good, respectively, market shares for drugj  are just 
In this model it is assumed that all aspects of market demand are com- 
pletely determined by  the mean utility level S,,  and, without going into 
the specifics of supply side dynamics and alternative characterizations of 
market equilibrium, we  adopt the special case of the logit model to solve 
for mean utility levels as a function of observed market shares. Given the 
utility function in equation (2), if  P, = P for all consumers i, and E,,  is an 
iid variable which follows the type I extreme value distribution, then mar- 
ket share of drugj  is given by the logit formula 
(4) 
By  substitution and by  normalizing the mean utility of the outside good 
to equal zero, we get the following linear model for market shares: 
u‘/ = X,/P, - ‘yP/  + 5,  +  EV. 
6,, = X,/P  - ‘yP/  +  5,,  > 
s/,  = q,I/(q//+  4 -  /I + 401). 
SJ&)  = exP@JexP(601  + q,). 
(5)  ln(~,/)  - ln(s”0 = 6/i  = x/tP - ‘YP/  +  5/r, 
where sJr  andpJt  are the quantity share and price of thejth DMARD at time 
t.  The unobserved characteristics of the drug, &, becomes the error term. 
In  our  implementation  of  this  basic  estimating  equation  we  deflate 
prices by  the BLS producer price index for pharmaceuticals to remove 
the general  trend of inflation. (This is equivalent to a slightly different 
8. See Berry (1994) for more on possible ways of  decomposing p, and on the assumptions 
that yield invariant 01  and p across individuals. Hedonic Analysis of Arthritis Drugs  449 
specification of equation [2]  with a normalization of the utility level of the 
outside good which leaves the price of the outside good in the estimating 
equation.) As argued below, we believe prices to be largely exogenous to 
this market and are therefore unconcerned about endogeneity of this vari- 
able. Given the panel structure of the data, we  can address the issue of 
potential correlation  between kJr and the other explanatory  variables by 
including a fixed drug effect, so that kJr = p,  + qJl  with qlr  assumed to have 
the usual desirable properties. 
11.5  Price and Quantity Data 
Econometric analysis of the market for DMARDs requires basic data 
on prices and quantities of these drugs sold, and careful attention to the 
definition of the RA market. Our primary data on prices and quantities 
for the DMARDs are drawn from reports of wholesale transactions in the 
United  States published by  IMS America  Inc., a market research com- 
pany. IMS collects information on revenues and quantities of individual 
drug products by wholesale distributors at a very fine level of detail; for 
example, 100-mg tablets, 100-count bottle. (We have also collected data on 
retail transactions in British Columbia which were reimbursed under the 
province’s Pharmacare program. The Pharmacare program is universal and 
covers all residents with varying levels of  coverage depending on socio- 
demographic status. Trends in these data match the U.S. wholesale market 
very closely.) 
A major difficulty with these kinds of data, however, is that they  are 
collected by drug product, not by disease indication. As pointed out above, 
many of the DMARDs have multiple uses, and in fact their primary use 
may be for quite different medical problems. Analyzing demand for these 
drugs for treatment of RA requires that we distinguish between these uses. 
This may not be important for measuring prices: Lacking some means to 
discriminate among consumers through packaging or reformulation it is 
not unreasonable to assume that one price holds for all sales of a particular 
formulation of a drug regardless of the intended use. This is likely to be 
particularly true for the wholesale market. By contrast, in measuring quan- 
tities it is vitally important to distinguish between markets in the sense of 
different medical conditions. Large (and varying) amounts of these drugs 
are used for treatment of other diseases. 
Figure 11.1 presents series on U.S. wholesale prices for DMARDs for 
the period  1980-92.  Prices are measured in dollars per daily dose unit. 
Daily doses are the “typical maintenance dose” taken from a number of 
standard reference publications such as the Physician’s Desk Reference. It 
should be noted that the dosage given to any particular patient may vary 
substantially from the amounts we  use here: Treatment of most patients 
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Fig. 11.1  Drug class shares of NDTI mentions for RA 
also  have  a fairly complicated  “ramp-up” dosage regime lasting many 
weeks before the maintenance dose is treated. Relative prices based on the 
cost  of  initiating  drug therapy  and maintaining it  for a  total of  three 
months are very similar to the daily dose prices presented here. 
Perhaps the most  striking feature of figure  11.1 is that prices are so 
similar across the major products and move so closely together. Over time 
prices rise steadily with general inflation, with few significant changes rela- 
tive to one another. The major exception is sulfasalazine, whose roughly 
constant nominal price corresponds to a sustained decline-in  real terms, 
a steady fall. Methotrexate’s price rises relatively steeply during the mid- 
1980s, driven largely by the introduction of Lederle’s branded Rheumatrex 
product, while the rate of increase in the price of the injectable gold prod- 
ucts moderates somewhat toward the end of the period. 
To address the market definition problem, we  need information on the 
fraction of each drug’s consumption which is specifically for the treatment 
of  RA. For this we  turn to another IMS publication, the National Drug 
and Therapeutic Index (NDTI). The NDTI reports results from surveying 
a sample of physicians. Each physician is asked to supply various pieces of 
information about patient visits; for our purposes the most useful data are 
the reports on primary diagnosis and which drugs (if any) were prescribed. 
In these reports a “drug mention” is equivalent to one prescription. IMS 
imputes figures for the total US. population from the survey sample and 
provides tabulations by drug and by diagnosis. Thus for each drug we can 
compute a breakdown of prescriptions by diagnosis, and for the diagnosis 
of RA, a breakdown of prescriptions by drug. These data provide valuable 
insight into market dynamics. 
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diagnosis, reporting the percentage of prescriptions of each drug for which 
RA was the primary diagnosis. This fraction is high and stable for some 
drugs such as injectable gold salts and auranofin, indicating  that their 
principal market is indeed RA. For other DMARDs, such as sulfasala- 
zine and azathioprine, the “outside” uses are very substantial, averaging 
more than 75 percent of prescriptions. Furthermore, there are significant 
changes in these fractions over time. The fraction of d-penicillamine used 
for RA falls from 91 percent in 1980 to 72  percent in 1992, while the same 
statistic for azathioprine rises from zero in 1980 to more than 50 percent 
in the mid-1980s before declining to 12 percent by  1992. 
Table  11.4 summarizes prescriptions  for each drug for which the pri- 
mary diagnosis was RA. The total number of mentions is greater than the 
number of visits because patients may be given more than one drug per 
visit (this occurs in approximately 80 percent of visits). Since these data 
are compiled from simple counts of mentions and thus do not reflect dif- 
ferences in the size of prescriptions, these are approximations at best. The 
share of gold salts, for example, may well be overstated because patients 
Table 11.3  NDTI Drug Mentions by Diagnosis: Fraction of RA by Drug 
Drug 
1980  Mean  1992  Major Other Use 
(Yo)  (1980-92  %)  (Yo)  (Mean 1980-92,  YO) 
Auranofin.$  92 
Gold salts  92 
Antimalarials  79 
Methotrexate, injectable  3 
Methotrexate, oral  0 
D-penicillamine  91 
Sulfasalazine  0 










12  Transplant, 56 
91 
56  Circulatory disorders, 9 
22  Cancer, 59 
69  Skin disease, 17 
72 
11  Digestive disorders, 83 
.+Introduced  in 1985. 
Table 11.4  Share of NDTI Drug Mentions for RA (Mean 1980-94) 
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Fig. 11.2  DMARDs: share within class of NDTI mentions for RA 
make weekly visits to their physician for an injection. On the other hand, 
methotrexate may  be prescribed  in a more  traditional manner  with  the 
patient visiting the physician  (and obtaining a new or refill prescription) 
much less frequently. Nonetheless these fractions are our best estimate of 
each drug’s share of the RA market.9 
Figure  11.2 summarizes quantity  shares within  the DMARD market 
graphically. The total size of the DMARD market (as measured  by  the 
number of mentions of these drugs in the NDTI grew somewhat over time 
from about 1.9 million mentions per year in the early 1980s to around 2.4 
million in the early  1990s. Much of this growth was driven, however, by 
increases in the numbers of patients diagnosed  with  RA, which  reflect 
changes in the demographics of the U.S. population. DMARDs as a class 
were a somewhat larger share of the total RA market  at the end of our 
sample period (around 28 percent in 1992 compared to 21 percent in 1980) 
which may reflect some market-expanding effect of improved quality and 
new  product  introductions,  but these changes  are dominated  by  move- 
ments within  the DMARD market. The most  striking feature of figure 
1 1.2 is the substantial fall in the share of injectable gold and the rise in the 
share  of  methotrexate.  D-penicillamine’s  share  falls  steadily  over  time 
while the other drugs’ shares are relatively small and stable. These patterns 
9. As an alternative to using NDTI data we have explored a small data set constructed 
from the B. C.  Pharmacare database where we include only prescriptions written by rheuma- 
tologists. The shares of  different DMARDs in these data are very similar to those in the 
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reflect the general impression to be gained from reading the clinical litera- 
ture: An increasing tendency to use methotrexate instead  of gold, with 
mixed opinions about the therapeutic value of the other agents. Auranofin, 
the only new chemical entity to enter this market in the sample period, 
was launched in the mid-1980s as an orally administered alternative to the 
injectable gold compounds, but achieved only a modest 10 percent share. 
To examine the relationship of prices and quantities to measured quality 
more carefully, we turn next to our estimation results. 
11.6  Results 
1  1.6.1  Price Equation 
Table  11.5 reports results from estimating the reduced  form hedonic 
price equation (1) using data on U.S. wholesale prices. To the extent that 
we  expect relative prices to respond to changes in measured characteris- 
tics, the results are disappointing. In models  1 and 2 we  regress the log 
Table 11.5  OLS Results: US.  Wholesale Prices, 1980-92 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Constant  4.84 (0.94)  -0.14  (0.14) 
EfficacyA  -5.68  (1.03) 
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Dummy  1984 




Dummy  1989 
Dummy  1990 
Dummy 199  1 
Dummy 1992 
R'  0.29  0.24 
in GS  -0.44  (0.42) 
in TJC  -  1.22 (0.40) 
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-0.77  (0.17) 
0.83 (0.22) 
-  1.37 (0.22) 
0.22 (0.29) 














Note: Standard errors in parentheses; N = 78. Dependent variable: Current U.S. dollars per daily dose. 
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of  daily dose price on to characteristics  variables  alone. The estimated 
parameters are contrary to our prior beliefs: Efficacy (whether measured 
by  the fraction of patients who do not drop out of trials because of lack 
of efficacy, or by  changes in the physiological  measurements  GS, TJC, 
and ESR) is negatively associated with price, while toxicity is positively 
associated. These results do not change when we  add a set of year dum- 
mies to the list of explanatory  variables,  though  the fit of the equation 
improves markedly. Coefficients on the time dummies imply a steady up- 
ward movement in prices, which is very similar whether or not we attempt 
to control for quality change. 
Why the characteristics variables should perform so poorly is puzzling. 
Considerable  experimentation  with alternative  ways of computing  these 
quality measures from the clinical trials data did not improve these results. 
Regardless of whether efficacy and toxicity are measured relative to pla- 
cebo or as unadjusted changes, or which of the alternative weighting and 
updating  schemes discussed  above is used,  we  still obtain the “wrong” 
signs on the estimated coefficients. One reason may be that measurement 
error is biasing the coefficient estimates.’O  This possibility should be taken 
seriously as the clinical trials literature is not unambiguous, and prescrib- 
ing physicians may be unaware or skeptical of  the results reported in the 
studies we use here. 
We prefer, however, to interpret these findings as evidence of an alterna- 
tive hypothesis about the nature of this market. Given the serious medical 
situation of most patients who are given DMARDs, and their lack of alter- 
natives, it seems likely that demand is quite inelastic. With many of these 
drugs having their primary use elsewhere, it is plausible that their prices 
are essentially exogenous to the RA market. Casual inspection of the raw 
data suggests that the level of prices for these drugs bears little relationship 
to measured characteristics, with some of the most toxic and least effica- 
cious drugs having  the highest  prices.  Furthermore,  looking at changes 
over time, we  see that prices for most of the drugs move steadily upward 
with general inflation,  with little change in relative prices.  Where move- 
ments  in prices conform  to our priors, any correlation  with  changes in 
measured quality appears to be swamped by the rest of the data. Seen in 
this light, the results obtained in the price equation may simply be spuri- 
ous, with  the coefficients on the characteristics  variables reflecting con- 
founding with other factors determining prices. 
Experience with  other pharmaceutical  price data as well  as informal 
evidence gathered in discussion with industry executives and other experts 
suggests also that relative prices for these products are very sticky. There 
is  some evidence  for  sensitivity of  pharmaceutical  prices  to exogenous 
10. Recall that with more than one variable potentially mismeasured, the resulting bias on 
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shocks such as regulatory changes; see Anis and Wen  (1998) and Scott 
Morton  (1997). On the other hand, other studies have found prices of 
branded products to be remarkably  insensitive to patent expiration and 
large-scale entry by  generics (see Griliches and Cockburn 1995). It may 
not therefore be a gross mischaracterization of historical industry pricing 
practice to summarize it as setting prices once (in real terms) at the time 
of  product  launch, with  subsequent revisions limited largely to adjust- 
ments for general inflation applied across a producer’s entire product line. 
Any price premium related to improved quality will therefore be difficult 
to see except in markets with substantial numbers of new products enter- 
ing over time, which is not the case here. In this light, it is worth pointing 
out that poor results were also reported in Berndt and Finkelstein’s (1992) 
study of hedonic pricing of anti-hypertensives, another drug class with a 
low rate of substantively new chemical entities reaching the market. 
With prices set exogenously to this market, and given that relative prices 
are likely far down the list of patients’ and physicians’ concerns when 
choosing which drug to use, it is likely that the impact of changes in quality 
manifest themselves in the market largely in changes in quantities, which 
is where we  turn next. 
11.6.2  Market Share Equations 
Table 11.6 presents estimates of the parameters of equation (9,  with 
and without fixed drug effects. In models 6 and 8 the toxicity and efficacy 
Table 11.6  OLS Results: Quantity Share Regression,  1980-92 
Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9 




Improvement in GS 










-18.81  (3.47)  -15.73  (3.58)  -8.63  (2.15) 
8.94 (3.73)  4.87 (4.04)  -0.94  (2.12) 
-0.15  (0.91)  -0.53  (0.92)  -4.48  (1.59) 
1.59 (0.85)  2.48 (1.25)  0.38 (0.47) 
0.92 (0.72)  2.53 (0.99)  -0.41  (0.49) 
-0.43  (0.61)  0.09 (0.68)  0.30 (0.48) 
-0.48  (0.46) 
-0.52  (0.33) 
2.36 (0.28) 
-0.09  (0.51) 
1.41 (0.31) 
0.71 (0.31) 
0.26  0.29  0.79 
-8.50  (2.13) 
-1.70  (2.27) 




-0.33  (0.46) 
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variables are based only on the most recently published trial in each year, 
while in models 7 and 9 they are computed as a three-year moving average 
of published trial results. In both cases the drug effect is calculated relative 
to placebo, but very similar results are obtained using just the change rela- 
tive to the baseline values. 
Results in models 6 and 7 are encouraging. The signs of the coefficients 
on the characteristics variables conform to our priors, with increased toxic- 
ity negatively associated with market share, and increased efficacy posi- 
tively associated. Though the coefficient on price is insignificant, and cor- 
responds to a very small elasticity, it is at least negative in model 6. A very 
small price effect is also consistent with our interpretation of results from 
estimating the price equation. 
Models 8 and 9 include fixed drug effects in the estimation to control 
for drug-specific problems in measuring market share or characteristics. 
Several of  these dummies are highly significant, and they markedly im- 
prove the fit of the model, suggesting that we  do indeed have systematic 
problems in measuring market shares. Furthermore the estimated coeffi- 
cients on the other variables change substantially when we  include fixed 
drug effects, indicating that the equations omit significant variables driving 
quantities consumed, either quality characteristics of drugs or other drug- 
specific factors which determine demand. 
11.7  Conclusion 
Economic considerations appear to play a relatively minor role in the 
market for DMARDs. Information from published clinical trials relating 
to key quality characteristics of these drugs (efficacy and toxicity) is statis- 
tically associated with changes in their quantity shares in this market, but 
has no consistent impact on relative prices. Given the nature of RA, these 
results may not be too surprising. They do, however, point to some inter- 
esting economic issues which we  have  not  attempted to address in  this 
study. 
First, there is  the question  of  using prices to measure the impact of 
technical change on consumer welfare in markets such as this one. Most 
prior work on innovation, quality change, and pricing has examined the 
prices of  new goods which embody technological change in the form of 
improvements to tangible aspects of quality. Here the technical  change 
takes a rather unusual form: R&D generates revisions to the intangible 
information set possessed by physicians and patients, affecting perceived 
quality  rather  than  physical  characteristics  such  as  speed,  durability, 
weight, and so on. R&D surely improves welfare in this context, but the 
fact that relative prices in  this market  change very little (and are most 
likely determined exogenously) and that demand appears to be quite price 
inelastic means that its impact is very difficult to see in price space. Rather, Hedonic Analysis of Arthritis Drugs  457 
the most visible direct effect of changes in quality is seen in movements in 
quantities, which has significant implications for how we  should interpret 
movements in, for example, a fixed-weight price index. 
Second, these results hint at an interesting variety of nonprice competi- 
tion. Rents to producers in this market are determined initially by the level 
of  prices (which to a rough approximation they set once in real terms, 
often based upon conditions prevailing in unrelated markets) and then by 
the evolution of  quantities as consumers and/or their agents respond to 
exogenous changes in perceived quality. In such circumstances the role 
played by marketing and promotional activity may well be very important. 
Our analysis here is  based on the generation of  new  information about 
product quality in the form of  publication of research results in peer re- 
viewed journals by (hopefully) impartial authors. The question of how this 
information reaches practicing physicians and their patients has not been 
examined here. In future work we  hope to extend our analysis of this mar- 
ket to include marketing and promotional activity by producers of these 
drugs, which may shed light on the interesting question of the relative im- 
portance of objective versus persuasive information in drug choices. 
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Comment  J. Steven Landefeld 
First, let me begin by saying that this is a good piece of research. It deals 
with an important problem in an interesting manner. As the authors point 
out, arthritis has a large economic impact, imposing a cost in the United 
States, for example, of over $65 billion in medical treatment costs and 
lost wages and salaries associated with morbidity. The disease also has an 
important “quality” dimension aside from its impact on mortality in that 
its main effect is a reduction in quality of life for patients who experience 
significant pain and suffering. 
The study represents an original application of  hedonic analyses: In- 
stead of examining a set of new goods or services with new or different 
characteristics, as most hedonic studies of quality change have (new gen- 
erations of computers, new types of telecommunications equipment, new 
treatments for heart attacks), it looks at a mainly fixed set of drugs whose 
“perceived”  characteristics change. Most of the drugs examined in this 
study have been in use for a long time; what has changed is the medical 
profession’s assessment of their efficacy and toxicity. 
The results of the study are also interesting. While quality (as measured 
J.  Steven Landefeld is director of  the Bureau  of  Economic Analysis, US. Department 
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by  efficacy and toxicity) appears to affect the share of  the market  ac- 
counted for by the various drugs, there does not appear to be any discern- 
ible impact of quality differences on their prices relative to one another. 
Indeed, quality and price appear to be inversely correlated-in  that higher 
prices are associated with lower efficacy and higher toxicity. In explaining 
this result,  the authors point  to the importance of other factors in de- 
termining prices, including the use of these same drugs to treat other dis- 
eases; inelastic demand by patients with rheumatoid arthritis (RA); insti- 
tutional stickiness in prices; and other price-determining factors such as 
promotional expenditures. 
As the representative of a U.S.  statistical agency, I was particularly inter- 
ested in what we at statistical agencies, along with other researchers, could 
learn from this study. The first lesson that I take away from this study is 
that hedonics may not always work. Hedonic regressions are an attempt 
to use observable differences in the qualities and characteristics of goods 
to see what consumers are willing to pay for those differences. Where those 
differences are hard to measure or where there are imperfections in mar- 
kets that make prices insufficiently reflective of consumer preferences, he- 
donics may not work or may produce implausible results. Alternatively, 
perhaps we should interpret the results of this study as an example where 
the measured price increase for the product understates the real (quality- 
adjusted) price increase. That is, drug prices went up, but quality declined. 
However, in this case, the issue would appear to be mainly related to prob- 
lems in  measuring quality  change and imperfections  in  the market for 
these drugs, 
In addition to these general conclusions, there are a number of more 
specific lessons to be learned from this study. First, in setting up a study, 
one should avoid cases where prices are exogenously determined. As the 
authors point out, most of the drugs used in treating RA were developed 
for treating other diseases and a very large share of total demand for these 
drugs is for other diseases. As a result, changes in the perceived quality of 
the drugs in treating RA may have little impact on the price of the drug. 
It is difficult to assess the significance of this problem because of difficul- 
ties in interpreting drug mentions in the National Drug and Therapeutic 
Index (NDTI) and changes in the share of mentions over time. However, 
for a number of the drugs, other diseases accounted for the majority of the 
therapeutic drug mentions. 
Second, one should be aware of  the degree to which the price of the 
good or service in question is competitively determined and thus reflective 
of consumer preferences. It is only in competitive markets free of external- 
aties that we can presume that price is equated with marginal utility, which 
in turn is equated with marginal cost. If these conditions are not likely to 
be fulfilled, it is difficult to  justify the use of hedonics to measure the value 
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special expertise in estimating value and would rather observe through 
hedonics what consumers are willing to pay; however, if other factors have 
a large impact on market prices there is little justification for the use of 
the results from hedonic regressions. 
In the case of drugs, there are significant problems fulfilling the competi- 
tive requirements for hedonic analysis. The demand for the product is in 
great part determined by  the physician rather than the consumer. Long- 
lived patents, advertising, distribution networks, and physician incentives 
have frequently been cited as sources of market power in the determination 
of drug prices. In addition, the third-party payment system means that the 
price faced by the consumer is often below the market price. In 1995, for 
example, third-party payments covered about 40 percent of overall drug 
expenditures and the proportion for prescription drugs such as those stud- 
ied in this paper are probably higher. 
The third thing that we learn from this study is the importance of having 
a good measure of quality (or of measuring a product whose quality actu- 
ally changes). Most of the drugs used to treat RA have been in use for a 
long period of time and it seems unlikely that the quality of these drugs 
(as measured by efficacy or toxicity) changed over time. However, the mea- 
sure of quality used in the study-perceived  quality by physicians as a re- 
sult of successive results from clinical trials-did  change. The results from 
the study may simply reflect the fact that from the patient’s viewpoint there 
were no changes in underlying quality and thus there was no little or no 
impact on price. 
Indeed, the results of the study may fit expectations-with  both market 
share and prices increasing with quality improvements-for  the two drugs 
that are considered new.  The first of these is Rheumatrex, which is not 
really a new drug, but was originally developed (under the name metho- 
trexate) for use in the treatment of cancer. As the authors point out, Led- 
erle gained regulatory approval for a formulation of methotrexate specifi- 
cally targeted to the RA market and introduced it under the brand name 
Rheumatrex in 1986. Rheumatrex’s price has increased more quickly than 
those of other drugs in the period following its introduction. During the 
study period, 1980-92,  Rheumatrex’s share of the market for RA drugs 
rose from 0 to 50 percent and appears to have accounted for the decline 
in the share of other drugs. The only other drug whose share has risen was 
auranofin, another new drug. Although the paper does not present sepa- 
rate quality-adjusted results for these drugs, the existing results suggest 
that one should concentrate  on new  products where characteristics are 
changing.  If  the  characteristics  of  the  other,  older drugs  really  didn’t 
change, the results-that  the coefficients with respect to the effect of qual- 
ity on price were mainly negative and insignificant-should  not be surpris- 
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the broad group of drugs may be a spurious correlation driven by the rising 
share accounted for by Rheumatrex. 
Given this list of things to watch out for in future studies, what advice 
can we offer the authors and other researchers? The authors of this study 
might profitably concentrate on methotrexate and auronafin. They might 
also develop an expanded joint product model for these two drugs that 
examines their other uses and the effect of promotional efforts on their 
prices and market shares. 
With respect to other researchers about to embark on hedonic analyses, 
they might profit when deciding on a subject for study by  examining the 
list of factors listed above (exogenously determined prices, serious imper- 
fection in markets, and inadequacies in measure of quality change). Re- 
searchers may also want to examine the data a bit, including quick reviews 
of simple correlations, before they commit to a particular project. 
If a  number  of  these problems are present, the researcher  faces the 
choice of moving on to another research project  or seeing what useful 
information can be extracted from the study. Researchers should be careful 
not to move on to another project too quickly. Moving on not only risks 
ignoring an important issue (either in terms of economic importance or in 
terms of social policy), but may bias the results by  ignoring those cases 
where quality has gone down. Thus, work on important issues should not 
be too quickly discarded even with the presence of the problems discussed 
above, but should be considered and where feasible work should proceed 
sequentially with each step having varying degrees of immediate appli- 
cation. 
One could, for example, begin by using the IMS and NDTI data in this 
study to develop a drug services price index that would measure the chang- 
ing cost of drug therapy for treating a case of rheumatoid arthritis. Given 
the importance of this disease, such an index would be most useful even 
if a hedonic quality-adjusted price index were not available. One could 
probably also use the annual price information and market share informa- 
tion to create an annual-weighted Fisher index to avoid the bias that would 
be introduced into a fixed-weighted price index by  the increasing market 
share of Rheumatrex. Finally, as suggested above, by focusing on the new 
drugs Rheumatrex and auranofin, and enriching the model to consider 
other factors influencing price and market share, one might develop a he- 
donic quality-adjusted index. This Page Intentionally Left Blank